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Abstract—We evaluate the secrecy performance of a mul-
tiple access cooperative network where the destination node
is wiretapped by a malicious and passive eavesdropper. We
propose the application of the network coding technique as an
alternative to increase the secrecy at the destination node, on
the top of improving the error performance of the legitimate
communication, already demonstrated in the literature. Network
coding is leveraged by assuming that the legitime cooperative
nodes are able to perform non-binary linear combinations of
different frames before the transmission. Different scenarios with
and without channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter
side are evaluated. The effectiveness of the proposed schemes is
evaluated in terms of secrecy outage probability through theoretic
and numerical analyses. It is shown that, even when the legitimate
transmitters do not have any CSI, the secrecy can be increased
through the use of network coding when compared to the direct
transmission and traditional cooperative techniques.
Index Terms—Cooperative communications, network coding,
wiretap channel, secrecy outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information security has become a major concern in wire-
less communications, due to the broadcast nature of the
wireless medium which allows eavesdroppers to potentially
intercept any transmission. Information theoretic secrecy, in-
troduced by Shannon in 1949 [1], is a promising approach
towards increasing communication security. In [2], Wyner
elaborated on the work of Shannon by introducing the so-
called wiretap channel, which is composed of a pair of legiti-
mate nodes communicating in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Recent works have applied information theoretic secrecy
ideas to wireless communications, showing that the random-
ness inherent to wireless channels can help in improving the
secrecy of the network [3]–[7], under different assumptions
regarding channel state information (CSI) at the transmitters.
When the transmitters have global CSI regarding the legitimate
and eavesdropper links, perfect secrecy is achieved by adapting
the rate of the wiretap code [3]. When only the CSI of the
legitimate channels are available at the transmitter side, as
commonly assumed in the literature [4], [5], [8]–[12], the
secrecy needs to be evaluated through a probabilistic analysis,
by finding the probability that the information is leaked to the
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eavesdropper for a given fixed secure transmission rate. The
problem of establishing secure communication in a scenario
without any CSI at the transmitter side was also addressed
in the literature [6], [7]. In this situation, the secrecy outage
probability becomes the union of two independent events: i.)
the reliability outage event, when the legitimate receiver could
not decode the transmitted message; and ii.) the secrecy outage
event, when the instantaneous capacity of the eavesdropper is
above the equivocation rate of the considered wiretap code.
Similarly to communication networks without secrecy con-
straints, the channel conditions dictate the network perfor-
mance. It is then necessary for the legitimate nodes to have
some advantage over the eavesdropper in terms of instanta-
neous channel quality to guarantee the existence of secure
communications. In this regards, many techniques have been
recently proposed to increase the secrecy in wireless networks.
Some of them consider the use of multiple antennas [8], [9], or
even adopt the concept of cooperative communications [10]–
[12], which is a technique initially proposed to increase the
reliability of wireless communications [13], [14]. In coop-
erative networks, the sources help each other by relaying
their messages, and the transmission is usually divided in two
phases: the so-called broadcast phase (BP), where the sources
broadcast their own information frames (IFs), and the coop-
erative phase (CP), where the nodes transmit parity frames
(PFs) to the destination, which are composed of redundant
information related to their own IFs and/or to the IFs of their
partners. One of the most well known cooperative protocols
is the decode-and-forward (DF) [13], where the nodes just act
as routers in the cooperative phase, relaying the IF from its
partner.
In [11], the authors presented a pioneering study on the se-
crecy of cooperative communications, by combining concepts
of the relay [15] and wiretap [2] channels in the so-called
relay-eavesdropper channel, as well as establishing the theo-
retical bounds for the rate-equivocation of the channel. More
recently, the secrecy performance of a cooperative network
under the DF protocol was carried out in [10], considering
either a passive or an active eavesdropper. It was shown in [10]
that cooperation is capable of increasing the network secrecy
when compared to the direct transmission.
The network coding technique [16] has been also recently
applied to cooperative networks, aiming to increase their
reliability [17], [18]. In a network-coded cooperative network,
the sources transmit linear combinations of different messages
instead as just acting as routers. It was shown in [17], [18] that,
2if such linear combinations are performed over a large enough
non-binary finite field GF(q), the system diversity order can
be increased when compared to the traditional DF protocol,
reducing the system outage probability.
Motivated by the promising performance of the network
coding technique, we presented in [12] some preliminary
results on the performance of such technique in a scenario
subject to secrecy constraints, where two sources aim to
cooperatively transmit independent information to a common
destination in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper. The
results in [12], which assumes CSI of the legitimate channels
at the transmitters, indicate the potential of network coding to
increase the secrecy.
A. Contributions
Against the background presented above, the novel contri-
butions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We elaborate on the results from [12] by extending
in time the code construction, allowing the sources to
transmit an arbitrary and independent number of frames
either in the broadcast or the cooperative phase. More
specifically, we adopt the generalized network coding
(GNC) scheme from [18] instead of the network coding
scheme from [17] adopted in [12];
• We also generalize the results in [12] to a network-coded
cooperative network with multiple (M ≥ 2) sources, ob-
taining closed-form approximations to the secrecy outage
probability under the assumption that the sources have
CSI of the legitimate channels, but do not know the
channel to the eavesdropper, as commonly assumed in
the literature;
• Since even partial CSI is not easy to be obtained in
practice, we also calculate the secrecy outage probability
of the network-coded cooperative scheme in the situation
where the sources do not have any CSI at all, and show
that even in this case network coding can be beneficial
towards increasing the network secrecy.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. In Section II
we introduce the system model, while Section III introduces
the concept of secrecy outage probability considering the
direct non-cooperative communication. Sections IV and V
present the DF and GNC cooperative protocols, respectively.
The secrecy outage analysis of the GNC scheme is carried
out in Section VI, which is followed by numerical results in
Section VII. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
Notations: log(·) denotes base-2 logarithm. (x)+ means
max{0, x}. Lower-case boldface symbols represent vectors.
The symbol ⊞ stands for summation over a finite field GF (q).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multiple access cooperative network com-
posed of M sources having independent information to trans-
mit to a common destination node. We assume the existence
of a malicious eavesdropper (also referred to as just E) near
the destination node, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Omitting the time
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Fig. 1. System model. Multi-source network where nodes (two in the
example, referred to as S1 and S2) have independent information to transmit
to a common destination (D) in the presence of an eavesdropper (E).
index, the signal received by node j after a transmission of
signal xi performed by source i is given by
yj =
√
Pid
−α
ij hijxi + nj , (1)
where Pi corresponds to the transmission power, dij > 1
represents the distance between sources i and j, α stands
for the path-loss exponent, hij represents the block-fading
coefficient, modeled as a circularly-symmetric complex Gaus-
sian independent and identically distributed random variable
(thus |hij | follows a Rayleigh distribution). The additive white
Gaussian noise is represented by nj and we assume unitary
bandwidth.
We adopt the notation i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M,D,E} when
referring to source 1 (S1) to source M (SM ), destination (D)
and eavesdropper (E), respectively. The instantaneous signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) is defined as
γij = γ¯ij |hij |
2, (2)
where γ¯ij = Pidα
ij
σ2
j
is the average SNR and σ2j is the noise
variance. We assume a symmetric scenario in which all source
nodes are approximately at the same distance from D; then
γ¯iD = γ¯D ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. Moreover, we also assume
that all sources are at approximately the same distance from
E, so that γ¯iE = γ¯E ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
Without secrecy constraints, assuming Gaussian inputs, an
outage event in an individual link occurs when the mutual
information I = log(1 + γ) falls below a given target
information rate R (in bits/channel use). The probability of
such an event is called outage probability, and is defined
as [19]
O(R, γ¯) , Pr {I < R}
= Pr
{
|h|2 <
2R − 1
γ¯
}
. (3)
One can see that the definition of outage probability pre-
sented in (3) corresponds to the cumulative density function
(CDF) of the random variable |h|2 evaluated at the point
(2R − 1)/γ¯. As |h| follows a Rayleigh distribution, then |h|2
is exponentially distributed and the outage probability in (3)
becomes [19]
O(R, γ¯) = 1− exp
(
−
2R − 1
γ¯
)
. (4)
Based on the formulation of the individual link outage prob-
ability, under the assumption that all the links throughout the
3network are subject to independent and identically distributed
Rayleigh fading, the overall outage probability of a generic
scheme X can be approximated for high SNR region as [18]
O˜X(R, γ¯) = µX
[
O(R, γ¯)
]DX
= µX
[
1− exp
(
−
2R − 1
γ¯
)]DX
,
(5)
where µX and DX correspond to the coding gain and diversity
order of scheme X , respectively. Moreover, the diversity order
DX is formally defined as [19]
DX , lim
γ¯→∞
− logOX(R, γ¯)
log γ¯
. (6)
In order to perform a fair comparison between different
protocols, one must take into account the multiplexing loss
inherent to many cooperative schemes [13]. Thus, we consider
that the target information rate of the generic cooperative
protocol X is given by RX , R/RX , where R is the
attempted transmission rate in the case of non-cooperative
direct transmission, and RX corresponds to the code rate of the
protocol X , defined as the ratio between the number of time
slots allocated to the transmission of new data and the total
number of time slots used by the protocol, with 0 ≤ RX ≤ 1.
For the direct transmission, RX = RDT = 1.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY (SOP)
In the case where the sources have global channel state
information (CSI), as in [3], perfect secrecy can be achieved by
adapting the rate of the wiretap code according to the instan-
taneous channels realization (seen at both the legitimate and
the eavesdropper). However, since assuming the knowledge of
instantaneous channel condition of the eavesdropper might not
be practical in several cases, in what follows we evaluate two
more realistic scenarios regarding the availability of CSI at
the source nodes: i) The sources have CSI of the legitimate
channels only; ii) The sources have no CSI at all.
A. Sources with partial CSI
When only the CSI of the legitimate links is available at
the sources, perfect secrecy cannot be guaranteed since the
instantaneous channel information from E is unknown. Thus,
a probabilistic secrecy analysis must be carried out [4], by
determining the probability that E successfully spies some
amount of information, for a given fixed secure transmission
rate (which implies a variable transmission rate over the
legitimate channel following its instantaneous capacity). It is
noteworthy that this is the scenario assumed in most papers
addressing secrecy outage probability in the literature, as for
instance [4], [8], [9].
More specifically, following the wiretap code construction
described for instance in [5], if we assume that the channel
condition of the legitimate destination is known at the sources,
we can design a wiretap code with block length n that
contains 2nR codewords, where the transmission rate R is
made equal to CD , the instantaneous channel capacity seen
at the legitimate destination. Moreover, we set a number of
codewords per bin in the wiretap code equal to 2nRE , where
RE is the eavesdropper’s equivocation rate. The rate of secure
communication is then Rs = R−RE = CD −RE , which is
usually fixed, implying that RE = CD −Rs varies according
to the channel condition seen at the legitimate destination.
Therefore, a secrecy outage event occurs when the instanta-
neous eavesdropper’s channel capacity, CE , exceeds the equiv-
ocation rate RE , or alternatively when the difference between
the instantaneous capacities of the main and the eavesdropper
channels CD−CE is lower than Rs [5]. Considering Gaussian
inputs, the instantaneous channel capacities are equal to the
instantaneous mutual information seen at the destination and
at the eavesdropper, respectively ID and IE , so that the
instantaneous secrecy capacity is finally written as [4], [5]
Cs = (ID − IE)
+
. (7)
From (7), it follows that the instantaneous secrecy capacity is
positive when γD > γE and equal to zero when γD ≤ γE .
Thus, the probability of existence of a non-zero secrecy
capacity is
Pr{Cs > 0} = Pr{γD > γE} (8)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γD
0
pγDγE (γD, γE)dγEdγD
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γD
0
pγD(γD)pγE (γE)dγEdγD.
Moreover, the secrecy outage probability (SOP) is the
probability that Cs is less than a target secrecy rate Rs [5]:
S = Pr {Cs < Rs} . (9)
For Rayleigh fading in the non-cooperative direct transmis-
sion (DT), the pdf and CDF of the random variable γD (the
same holds to γE) are given by [19]
FγD (γD) = 1− exp
(
−
γD
γ¯D
)
, (10a)
pγD (γD) =
∂ [FγD (γD)]
∂γD
=
1
γ¯D
exp
(
−
γD
γ¯D
)
, (10b)
leading to the following probability of existence of non-zero
secrecy capacity [4]
Pr{Cs,DT > 0} =
γ¯D
γ¯D + γ¯E
. (11)
The SOP, in turn, was shown in [4] to be
ScsiDT = 1−
γ¯D
γ¯D + 2Rγ¯E
exp
(
−
2R − 1
γ¯D
)
. (12)
B. Sources without CSI
In this case we assume that the transmitters do not have CSI
of either the legitimate or the eavesdropper channels. Thus,
the instantaneous capacity seen at the legitimate destination,
CD, is not known at the transmitters and therefore we must
choose a fixed total number of 2nR codewords and a fixed
number of codewords per bin equal to 2nRE in the wiretap
code. The fixed rate of attempted secure communication is
4then Rs = R−RE . Therefore, an outage corresponds to the
occurrence of any of the following two independent events [6]:
i) The instantaneous channel capacity seen at the legitimate
destination is smaller than R. Such an event is referred to as
reliability outage and has probability Pr{ID < R}; ii) The
instantaneous channel capacity seen at eavesdropper is larger
than the equivocation rate RE of the wiretap code, so that the
eavesdropper is able to recover at least part of the information
intended to the legitimate transmitter. This event is referred to
as secrecy outage, and has probability of occurrence given by
Pr{IE≥RE}.
The overall secrecy outage probability is then given by the
union of the two aforementioned independent events, being
represented by
Sno-csi = Pr
{
(ID < R)
⋃
(IE ≥ RE)
}
= Pr {ID < R} + Pr {IE ≥ RE}
− Pr{ID < R, IE ≥ RE}.
(13)
Generically, the secrecy outage probability of a given
scheme X is obtained according to (13) as
Sno-csiX = OX(R, γ¯D) + [1−OX(RE , γ¯E)]
−OX(R, γ¯D) [1−OX(RE , γ¯E)] ,
(14)
where OX(R, γ¯) is the reliability outage probability of
scheme X .
For the direct transmission, through the substitution of (4)
in (14), one can show that the SOP when the sources do not
have any CSI is
Sno-csiDT = 1−exp
(
−
2R − 1
γ¯D
)[
1−exp
(
−
2RE − 1
γ¯E
)]
. (15)
IV. DECODE-AND-FORWARD (DF)
The decode-and-forward (DF) is a well established coop-
erative protocol, being largely investigated in recent works
on cooperative communication, e.g. [10], [11], [13], [14]. In
the DF protocol, after broadcasting their own IFs in the first
time slot, each source retransmits a given partner’s IF in
the cooperative phase, usually adopting the same codebook
(repetition code) as the source, as illustrated in Fig. 2(a) for a
two-source network. Upon receiving two copies of the same
message, the receiver performs maximum ratio combining
(MRC) to optimally combine both observations. One can see
that the code rate of DF is given by RDF = 1/2, since one PF is
transmitted in the cooperative phase for every IF broadcasted
previously. Thus, in order to perform a fair comparison to the
DT scheme, one must transmit with a transmission rate twice
that of DT.
A. Sources with partial CSI
When the sources have CSI of the legitime channels, the
instantaneous secrecy capacity of the DF scheme is [10]
Cs,DF =
1
2
(
log2(1 + γD)− log2(1 + γE)
)+
, (16)
where γD and γE are respectively the instantaneous SNR at
D and E after combining the messages. Assuming that the
channels between the sources are error-free1 and focusing on
the message of S1 (the same result is valid to the other source
due to the symmetry), the instantaneous SNR seen at D and
E after performing MRC is [19]
γD = γ¯1D|h1D|
2 + γ¯2D|h
′
2D|
2,
= γ¯D
(
|h1D|
2 + |h′2D|
2
)
,
(17a)
γE = γ¯1E |h1E |
2 + γ¯2E |h
′
2E |
2,
= γ¯E
(
|h1E |
2 + |h′2E |
2
)
,
(17b)
where the superscript ′ refers to the channel realization in
the cooperative phase (hiD and h′iD are assumed to be
independent). From the results in [4], [13], it can be shown
that the SOP of the two-source DF scheme in this case is
ScsiDF = Pr{Cs,DF < Rs}
= 1−
γ¯D
(γ¯D + ξ γ¯E)
3 exp
(
−
ξ − 1
γ¯D
)
×
[
γ¯D (ξ − 1 + γ¯D) + ξ γ¯E (ξ− 1+3 γ¯D)
]
,
(18)
where ξ = 22Rs .
B. Sources without CSI
When the sources do not have any CSI, the exact SOP of
the two-source DF scheme is obtained from (14) as
Sno-csiDF = OMRC(2R, γ¯D) + [1−OMRC(2RE , γ¯E)]
−OMRC(2R, γ¯D) [1−OMRC(2RE , γ¯E)]
= 1−
[
1−exp
(
−
22RE − 1
γ¯E
)[
1+
22RE − 1
γ¯E
]]
× exp
(
−
22R − 1
γ¯D
)[
1+
22R − 1
γ¯D
]
,
(19)
where OMRC(R, γ¯) corresponds to the 2-branch outage prob-
ability of the MRC scheme, which is given by [19]
OMRC(R, γ¯) = 1−exp
(
−
2R − 1
γ¯
)[
1+
2R − 1
γ¯
]
. (20)
V. NETWORK-CODED COOPERATION (NC)
In a non-binary network-coded (NC) based cooperative
protocol with two sources, instead of just acting as routers,
the sources are able to transmit linear combinations of all the
available IFs during the cooperative phase, as illustrated in
Fig. 2(b). If such linear combinations are performed over a
high enough finite field, it is shown in [17] that gains in terms
of diversity order can be achieved over the DF scheme.
Let us focus again on the message from S1 and focus for
the moment being in the two-source case. If the intersource
channel is not in outage (which happens with probability 1−
O(2R, γ¯D), where 1−O(2R, γ¯D) is the outage probability of
an individual link obtained from (4)), we can see that D is able
to recover S1’s message from any two out the following four
received frames: I1, I2, I1⊞I2, I1⊞2I2 (the symbol⊞ stands
1Note that this is an optimistic assumption that favors the DF scheme when
compared to the other schemes. As our goal is to show that the network
coding technique can outperform traditional cooperation protocols as DF, this
assumption does not invalidate our results.
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Fig. 2. Two-source time division channel allocation considering (a) Decode-and-Forward (DF) protocol; (b) Network Coding-based (NC) protocol; (c)
Generalized Network Coding-based (GNC) protocol. T represents the time-slot duration and the symbol ⊞ in (b) stands for summation over a finite field. In
(c), ⊞i[k] corresponds to a linear combination transmitted by source i at time slot k, which is composed of all the IFs received during the broadcast phase,
including source’s i own IFs.
for summation over a finite field). The information frame from
S1 is not recovered by D when the direct transmission and at
least two out of the three remaining packets cannot be decoded,
which happens with probability [17]
O1(R, γ¯D)) ≈ 3
[
O(2R, γ¯D)
]3
. (21)
When the channel between S1 and S2 is in outage (which
happens with probability O(2R, γ¯D)), S1 and S2 retransmit
their own messages in the cooperative phase. Upon receiving
two copies of the same message, we assume that D performs
MRC, leading to the outage probability presented in (20).
The overall outage probability of the NC scheme was shown
in [17] to be
ONC(R, γ¯D) = [1−O(2R, γ¯D)] O1(R, γ¯D)
+ O(2R, γ¯D)OMRC(2R, γ¯D)
≈ 3.5
[
1− exp
(
−
22R − 1
γ¯D
)]3
,
(22)
where the approximation holds for the high SNR region.
We can see from (22) that diversity order of 3 is achieved,
in contrast to the diversity order of 2 obtained by the DF
scheme [17].
In [18], a generalization of the scheme proposed in [17] was
presented, as illustrated in Fig. 2(c). In the scheme proposed
in [18], referred to as generalized network coding (GNC), the
sources are able to broadcast k1 IFs in the broadcast phase,
as well as transmit an arbitrary number k2 of PFs in the
cooperative phase, leading to a more flexible network code
rate given by [18]
RGNC =
k1
k1 + k2
. (23)
In this scenario with two sources, when the intersource
channel is not in outage (which happens with probability
1−O(R/RGNC, γ¯D)), the destination receives 2(k1+k2) frames
(each source broadcasts k1 IFs and then transmits k2 PFs in the
cooperative phase), and a given IF is not recovered by D when
the direct transmission and at least 2k2 out of the remaining
2(k2+k1)−1 frames cannot be decoded, which happens with
probability [18]
O1(R, γ¯D) = O
2k1−1∑
i=0
µGNC1(i)O
2k2+i[1−O]2k1−1−i, (24)
where O is the short to O(R/RGNC, γ¯D) and µGNC1(i) =(
2k2+2k1−1
2k2+i
)
corresponds to a binomial coefficient that takes
into account the multiplicity of independent events that lead
to the same outage probability.
When the intersource channel is in outage (which happens
with probability O12 = O(R/RGNC, γ¯D)), a given IF is not
recovered by D when the direct transmission and at least k2
out of the k2+k1− 1 remaining frames cannot be decoded,
which happens with probability [18]
O2(R, γ¯D) = O
k1−1∑
i=0
µGNC2(i)O
k2+i[1−O]k1−1−i, (25)
where µGNC2(i) =
(
k2+k1−1
k2+i
)
. The overall outage probability of
the two-source GNC scheme is then given by:
OGNC(R, γ¯D) =
= (1−O12)O1(R, γ¯D)+O12O2(R, γ¯D)
= (1−O12)O
2k1−1∑
i=0
µ1(i)O
2k2+i[1−O]2k1−1−i
+O12O
k1−1∑
i=0
µ2(i)O
k2+i[1−O]k1−1−i.
(26)
A. Extension to the M -source scenario
When the intersource channels are assumed to be outage-
free, the outage probability of the M -source GNC scheme is
obtained through the generalization of (24) as
O1(R, γ¯D) = O
Mk1−1∑
i=0
µGNC1(i)O
Mk2+i[1−O]Mk1−1−i,
(27)
6where µGNC1(i) =
(
Mk2+Mk1−1
Mk2+i
)
. As presented in [18], the
outage probability from (27) can be accurately approximated
for the large SNR region as:
OGNC(R, γ¯D) ≈ µGNC1
[
1− exp
(
−
2R/RGNC − 1
γ¯D
)]Mk2+1
,
(28)
where µGNC1 =
(
Mk2+Mk1−1
Mk2
)
. Moreover, according to [18],
when the intersource channels are subject to outages, the
diversity is reduced and the approximation for the outage
probability of a network with M sources operating under the
GNC scheme with parameters (k1, k2) becomes
O˜GNC(R, γ¯D) ≈ µGNC2
[
1− exp
(
−
2R/RGNC − 1
γ¯D
)]M+k2
,
(29)
where µGNC2 =
(
k1+k2−1
k2
)
. From (29), it can be seen that the
diversity order of the GNC scheme is M + k2. By properly
choosing the values of k1 and k2, it can be shown that the GNC
scheme can achieve both code rate and diversity order larger
than the NC scheme. It is also worthy mentioning that the
GNC scheme reduces to the NC scheme when k1 = k2 = 1.
Regarding the code design, the maximum diversity order of
the GNC scheme is guaranteed if the coefficients of the linear
combinations are chosen from a maximum distance separable
(MDS) code2 [18].
VI. NETWORK-CODED COOPERATION WITH SECRECY
CONSTRAINTS
In what follows we evaluate the SOP of the GNC scheme
considering both the situations with partial CSI and without
any CSI at the legitimate sources.
A. Sources with partial CSI
In this situation, the sources know the legitimate channels
and the SOP for the GNC scheme is obtained according to (9)
as
SGNC = Pr {Cs,GNC < Rs}
= Pr
{
RGNC
(
log2(1 + γD)− log2(1 + γE)
)+
< Rs
}
= Pr
{
γD < 2
Rs/RGNC(1 + γE)− 1
}
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γU
0
pγD,γE (γD, γE)dγDdγE
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γU
0
pγD(γD)pγE (γE)dγDdγE
=
∫ ∞
0
FγD (γU )pγE (γE)dγE ,
(30)
where γU = 2Rs/RGNC(1 + γE)− 1.
According to (30), in order to calculate the SOP, one must
have the CDF of γD and the pdf of γE . The CDF is directly
2Note that the MDS code is applied on the top of the Wiretap coding
applied in the physical layer.
obtained from the outage probability, whose exact value for a
two-source GNC scheme is presented in (26), leading to
FγD (γD) = OGNC(R, γ¯D). (31)
The pdf of γE , in turn, can be obtained by differentiating
the outage probability (CDF) at the eavesdropper from (26):
pγE (γE) =
∂ [OGNC(RE , γ¯E)]
∂γE
. (32)
Note that the exact outage probability in (26) is composed
of several terms which results in a integration with multiple
parts in (30) and finally in a long expression which leads to
little insights. Besides that, (26) is restricted to the two-source
case so that obtaining a generic closed-form exact expression
is a tough task. Thus, in order to ease the analysis and the
comprehension of the final results, in what follows we resort
to (as will be shown shortly) a tight approximation through
the following assumptions: i) We consider that the legitimate
network is subject to outages in the intersource channels, so
that the CDF of γD is approximated by (29); ii) The CDF of E
is approximated by (28), which is an assumption that favors E,
and makes the analysis more tractable, since the outages in the
intersource channel do not depend on the rate RE , otherwise
one would have to distinguish between the outages in the
intersource channels and the outages in the direct channels
when calculating the overall outage at E.
The CDF and pdf of γD are then approximated by3
FγD (γD) ≈
[
1− exp
(
−
γD
γ¯D
)]M+k2
. (33a)
pγD (γD) =
∂ [FγD (γD)]
∂γD
≈
M+k2
γ¯D
exp
(
−
γD
γ¯D
)
×
[
1− exp
(
−
γD
γ¯D
)]M+k2−1
.
(33b)
The CDF and pdf of γE , in turn, are considered to be
FγE (γE) ≈
[
1− exp
(
−
γE
γ¯E
)]Mk2+1
. (34a)
pγE (γE) =
∂ [FγE (γE)]
∂γE
≈
Mk2+1
γ¯E
exp
(
−
γE
γ¯E
)
×
[
1− exp
(
−
γE
γ¯E
)]Mk2
.
(34b)
By replacing the CDF and pdf of both γD and γE in (30),
one can obtain an approximate expression for the SOP of the
GNC scheme as presented in the following theorem.
3Note that µGNC1 and µGNC2 are made equal to one in (33) and (34) in
order to limit the CDF and pdf to the unity and to have unity area, respectively,
because the expressions in (29) and (28) are approximations for the high SNR
and are not naturally limited to such values.
7Theorem 1. The SOP of the GNC scheme with partial CSI is
approximated as
ScsiGNC ≈ (Mk2+1)
M+k2∑
i=0
(
M+k2
i
)
[−1]i exp
(
−
ξ − 1
γ¯D
i
)
× B
(
ξ γ¯Ei+ γ¯D
γ¯D
,Mk2+1
)
,
(35)
where ξ = 2Rs/RGNC and B(x, y) =
∫ 1
0 t
x−1(1− t)y−1dt cor-
responds to the Beta function (first order Euler function) [20].
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
From Theorem 1, one can obtain the diversity order of the
GNC scheme subjected to secrecy constraints as follows.
Corollary 1. The diversity order of the M -source GNC
scheme with parameters (k1, k2) is not reduced due to secrecy
constraints, that is, it remains equal to M + k2.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
B. Sources without CSI
When CSI is not available at the transmitter side, the exact
SOP of the two-source GNC is obtained according to (14)
after the substitution of OX(R, γ¯D) and OX(RE , γ¯E) by the
exact outage probability from (26). Similarly to the case with
partial CSI, in order to make the analysis more tractable,
we favor E here by considering that the outage probability
experienced by E is obtained under the assumption of perfect
intersource channels, that is, OX(RE , γ¯E) is dominated by
the term O1(RE , γ¯E) in (26). Thus, the SOP of a two-source
network operating under the GNC scheme is approximated by
Sno-csiGNC ≈ OGNC(R, γ¯D) +
[
1−O1(RE , γ¯E)
]
−OGNC(R, γ¯D)
[
1−O1(RE , γ¯E)
]
,
(36)
where OGNC(R, γ¯D) and O1(RE , γ¯E) are obtained respec-
tively from (26) and (24). Regarding its asymptotic behavior
with the increase of γ¯D, the SOP from (36) presents a different
behavior than the SOP of the GNC scheme with partial CSI
from (35), as presented in the following Theorem.
Theorem 2. When the SNR of the legitimate nodes increases
without limit, the SOP of the GNC scheme presents an outage
floor which is given by
~Sno-csiGNC = limγ¯D→∞
Sno-csiGNC
≈ 1−O1(RE , γ¯E).
(37)
Proof: We can see from (4) that O(R, γ¯D) → 0 when
γ¯D → ∞. By replacing O(R, γ¯D) = 0 in (14) and then
in (36), one can see that the SOP is limited by the secrecy
outage event (IE ≥ RE), whose probability of occurrence
for the M -source GNC scheme obtained from the complement
of (27) leads to (37), concluding the proof.
In general, for the case of a M -source network, we can
approximate the SOP from (36) by resorting to the high-
SNR approximations of OGNC(R, γ¯D) and O1(RE , γ¯E) given
respectively in (29) and (28), which leads to
S˜no-csiGNC ≈ 1−µGNC1
[
1−exp
(
−
2RE/RGNC − 1
γ¯E
)]Mk2+1
×
[
1−µGNC2
[
1−exp
(
−
2R/RGNC − 1
γ¯D
)]M+k2]
.
(38)
However, as will be presented in the next section, even
though the approximation from (38) is useful in obtaining an
approximation to the slope of the SOP, it does not accurately
represent the floor in the SOP according to (37). Thus, in what
follows we present a more accurate approximation for the M -
source GNC scheme than (38).
Corollary 2. The SOP of the M -source GNC scheme can be
approximated as
Sno-csiGNC ≈ max
{
~Sno-csiGNC , S˜
no-csi
GNC
}
, (39)
where ~Sno-csiGNC and S˜no-csiGNC are obtained from (37) and (38),
respectively.
Proof: Since the approximation (38) does not reflect the
actual behavior of the floor in the SOP, one can limit the SOP
to the aforementioned floor by taking the maximum between
the approximation in (38) and the asymptotic value from (37).
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some numerical results in order to
validate the results obtained analytically. For the GNC scheme,
the instantaneous SNRs γD and γE were obtained according to
the inverse transform sampling method [21]. In what follows,
Figs. 3-6 refer to the case with partial CSI at the sources, while
the scenario without any CSI at the sources is evaluated in
Figs. 7-10. Unless stated otherwise, we assume the parameters
M = k1 = k2 = 2 for the GNC scheme, in order to perform
a fair comparison to the DF scheme, such that the number of
users and the code rate are the same.
Fig. 3 presents the SOP versus γ¯D for the DT, DF and
GNC schemes, considering that Rs = 0.5 bits per channel
use (bpcu) and that γ¯E = 10 dB, as well as assuming CSI of
the legitimate channels at the sources. For the GNC scheme in
Fig. 3, “numerical” refers to the numerical result obtained from
the exact SOP via Monte Carlo method, while “approx” refers
to the analytical high-SNR approximation from (35). We can
see that the GNC scheme presents the highest diversity order
(slope of the curve) among all the three schemes, matching
the value M +k2 = 4 (represented by the curve “asymp”)
according to Corollary 1, which means that the GNC scheme
outperforms the other schemes when a low SOP is required. It
can also be seen that the numerical results match the analytical
ones with good precision.
The influence of γ¯E in the SOP performance of the GNC
scheme with partial CSI is evaluated in Fig. 4, considering that
Rs = 0.5 bpcu and γ¯E = {5, 10, 15} dB. We can see that
when γ¯E increases, the SOP performance is degraded in terms
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus γ¯D for the DT, DF and GNC
schemes (with M = k1 = k2 = 2), considering Rs = 0.5 bpcu and Eve’s
average SNR γ¯E = 10 dB. Partial CSI scenario.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability versus γ¯D for GNC scheme (with M =
k1 = k2 = 2), considering Rs = 0.5 bpcu and Eve’s average SNR γ¯E =
{5, 10, 15} dB. Partial CSI scenario.
of coding gain (the curve is moved to the right). However, the
diversity order remains unchanged.
Fig. 5 evaluates the SOP of the DT, DF and GNC schemes
with partial CSI as a function of the secrecy rate Rs. One can
see that the cooperative schemes outperform the DT up to a
certain threshold of Rs, from which the DT presents the lowest
SOP. However, for the low-SOP region, the GNC scheme is
the one that presents the best performance.
The SOP versus γ¯D for the GNC scheme with different
numbers of sources M is presented in Fig. 6. We can see that
the performance of the scheme, as its diversity order, increases
as the number of users increases. However, the relative gains
diminish with the increase of M .
Fig. 7 considers the case without CSI at the sources, and
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability versus Rs for DT, DF and GNC (with
M = k1 = k2 = 2) schemes, considering γ¯D = 40 dB and γ¯E = 10 dB.
Partial CSI scenario.
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Fig. 6. Secrecy outage probability versus γ¯D for GNC scheme (with k1 =
k2 = 2), considering Rs = 0.5 bpcu, γ¯E = 10 dB and M = {2, 4, 8, 16}.
Partial CSI scenario.
shows the SOP versus γ¯D for the situation where R = 3 bpcu,
RE = 2 bpcu and γ¯E = 2 dB. In Fig. 7, “theoretic”
refers to the SOP obtained from (36), “approx” refers to the
approximation in (38) and “asymp” to the asymptotic result
according to (37). One can see that all the considered schemes
present an error floor which is limited by the secrecy outage
event, however, the floor of the GNC scheme is the lowest. It is
also worth noting that the exact SOP is well approximated by
the maximum between the approximated and the asymptotic
results from (39), Corollary 2.
The influence of γ¯E in the SOP performance in the case
without CSI is evaluated in Fig. 8, for the DT, DF and
GNC schemes with R = 3 bpcu, RE = 2 bpcu and
γ¯D = 30 dB. One can see that the GNC scheme presents
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Fig. 7. Secrecy outage probability versus γ¯D for the DT, DF and GNC (with
M = k1 = k2 = 2) schemes without CSI at the transmitters, considering
R = 3 bpcu, RE = 2 bpcu and Eve’s average SNR γ¯E = 2 dB. No CSI
scenario.
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Fig. 8. Secrecy outage probability versus γ¯E for the DT, DF and GNC (with
M = k1 = k2 = 2) schemes without CSI at the transmitters, considering
R = 3 bpcu, RE = 2 bpcu and γ¯D = 30 dB. No CSI scenario.
the lowest SOP for the whole considered range. It can also be
seen that the approximation from (39) is useful in obtaining
an approximation for the SOP of the GNC scheme.
Fig. 9 evaluates the influence of the secrecy rate Rs on the
performance of the DT, DF and GNC schemes, considering
that RE = 2 bpcu, γ¯E = 2 dB and γ¯D = 40 dB. We can
see that the SOP of all schemes increase when Rs increases.
However, the GNC is the scheme that presents the lowest SOP
in the region of low SOP.
Fig. 10 presents the SOP versus γ¯D for the GNC scheme
with different numbers of sources M . We can see that the
performance of the scheme is improved as the number of users
increases. However, besides the relative gains diminish with
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Fig. 9. Secrecy outage probability versus Rs for the DT, DF and GNC (with
M = k1 = k2 = 2) schemes, considering RE = 2 bpcu, γ¯E = 2 dB and
γ¯D = 40 dB. No CSI scenario.
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Fig. 10. Secrecy outage probability versus γ¯D for the GNC scheme (with
k1 = k2 = 2), considering R = 3 bpcu, RE = 2 bpcu, γ¯E = 2 dB and
M = {2, 4, 8, 16}. No CSI scenario.
the increase of M , one can see that the floor in the SOP is
approximately the same, independently of M . This is due to
the fact that the floor corresponds to the complement of the
outage probability so that its variation is only noticeable at the
high SOP range.
VIII. FINAL COMMENTS
We evaluated the secrecy outage probability of a multi-
source cooperative network where the destination node is
wiretapped by a malicious and passive eavesdropper. We
proposed the application of the network coding technique
as an alternative to increase the secrecy at the destination
node. Different scenarios with partial and completely without
channel state information (CSI) at the sources were evaluated
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and we showed through theoretic and numerical analyses that
the secrecy can be significantly increased through the use of
network coding when compared to the direct transmission and
traditional cooperative techniques.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: After replacing the CDF of γD obtained
from (33a) and the pdf of γE obtained from (34b) in (30),
we have that:
ScsiGNC =
∫
∞
0
FγD (γU )pγE (γE)dγE
≈
Mk2+1
γ¯E
∫ ∞
0
A︷ ︸︸ ︷[
1− exp
(
−
γU
γ¯D
)]M+k2
× exp
(
−
γE
γ¯E
)[
1− exp
(
−
γE
γ¯E
)]Mk2
dγE .
(40)
We then expand term A in (40) using the binomial expansion
[1− x]n =
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
[−1]ixi, leading to:
ScsiGNC ≈
Mk2+1
γ¯E
∫
∞
0
M+k2∑
i=0
(
M+k2
i
)
[−1]i exp
(
−
γU
γ¯D
i
)
× exp
(
−
γE
γ¯E
)[
1− exp
(
−
γE
γ¯E
)]Mk2
dγE .
(41)
According to [20, eq. (3.312.1)], one has that:∫ ∞
0
[
1−exp
(
−
x
β
)]ν−1
exp (−αx) dx = βB (βα, ν) . (42)
Thus, by substituting γU = ξ(1 + γE) − 1 in (41) and
substituting in (42) β = γ¯E , ν = Mk2 + 1, and α =
(ξγ¯Ei + γ¯D)/(γ¯Dγ¯E), we can obtain (35), concluding the
proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof: According to the definition of diversity order
presented in (6), one must evaluate the asymptotically behavior
of the outage probability with respect to γ¯D. For large values
of γ¯D, the Beta function from (35) can be approximated
as [20]:
B
(
ξ γ¯Ei+ γ¯D
γ¯D
,Mk2+1
)
≈ B (1,Mk2+1)
=
Γ(1) Γ(Mk2+1)
Γ(Mk2+2)
=
1
Mk2+1
,
(43)
where Γ(·) corresponds to the complete Gamma function [20].
Thus, by replacing (43) in (35), one have that:
ScsiGNC ≈
[
Mk2+1
]M+k2∑
i=0
(
M+k2
i
)
[−1]i exp
(
−
ξ − 1
γ¯D
i
)
×
[
1
Mk2+1
]
=
M+k2∑
i=0
(
M+k2
i
)
[−1]i exp
(
−
ξ − 1
γ¯D
i
)
.
(44)
After resorting to the fact that
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
[−1]ixi = [1−x]n,
the SOP from (44) can be rewritten as
ScsiGNC ≈
[
1− exp
(
−
ξ − 1
γ¯D
)]M+k2
. (45)
Finally, the diversity order M + k2 from Corollary 1 is
obtained by applying (45) in (6).
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